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Casta~ neda et al. (1998) document that the US income distribution is highly, but not
perfectly procyclical for the low income quintiles, countercyclical for the top 60-95%, and
acyclical for the top 5%. They also present a dynamic general equilibrium model with
in¯nitely-lived agents and unemployment risk that is able to replicate the movements of
the lower income quintiles. During a boom, the number of unemployed workers decreases.
As a consequence, the relative income share of the lower income quintiles rises at the
expense of the higher income quintiles. However, the income shares are almost perfectly
correlated with output, either positively or negatively. Therefore, they also fail to replicate
the income dynamics of the very rich that is acyclical.
In this paper, we present a simple business cycle model with overlapping generations and
elastic labor supply in order to improve upon the modeling of the cyclical income distri-
bution dynamics. We consider households with di®erent productivity types. In addition,
individual productivity is also age-dependent and subject to an idiosyncratic shock so that
we are able to match both the observed income and wealth heterogeneity. The latter
feature, of course, is important for the study of the factor income distribution dynam-
ics. Aggregate uncertainty is introduced in the form of a shock on aggregate production
technology as in Casta~ neda et al. (1998) .
In our model, the almost perfect correlation of the lower income quintiles with output is
reduced as the high-productivity agents have a more elastic labor supply than their low-
productivity contemporanies.1 In addition, the share of the top 5% of the income earners is
almost acyclical as i) many of the income-rich agents are wealth-rich retired agents and ii)
the wealth-rich workers also have a less elastic labor supply than the wealth-poor workers.
During an economic expansion, both wages and pensions increase. Pensions are tied to the
current wage rate. However, workers increase their labor supply, which is not possible for
retired workers. Therefore, the income share of workers increases and is procyclical.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our model. Our results are
presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. The computation is explained in more detail
in the Appendix.
2 The model
Three di®erent sectors are depicted: households, ¯rms, and the government. Households
di®er with regard to their individual productivity and are also subject to idiosyncratic
productivity risk. They maximize discounted life-time utility with regard to their in-
tertemporal consumption, capital, and labor supply. Firms are competitive and maximize
pro¯ts. The government provides pensions which it ¯nances with a tax on wage income.
1Heer and Maussner (2007) show that this need not be the case in the presence of progressive income
taxation.
12.1 Households
Households live 70 periods. Periods are equal to one year. Households are born at age
1 (corresponding to real life-time age 20). Each generation is of measure 1/70. The ¯rst
45 periods, they are working, the last 35 periods, they are retired and receive pensions.

















The total time endowment is equal to one and allocated between leisure l and work n,
n + l = 1.
The worker's labor productivity e(s;²;z) = ²ze¹ ys depends on the agent's permanent e±-
ciency type ² 2 E = f²1;²2g, his idiosyncratic stochastic productivity z 2 Z = fz1;z2g, and
his age s 2 S. This modeling of labor productivity has often been applied in DGE (dynamic
general equilibrium) analysis for the following reasons: i) Di®erences in the permanent ef-
¯ciency type ² help to generate the wage heterogeneity that is observed empirically. In our
case, two di®erent e±ciency types are enough to achieve this aim. ii) Workers will build up
precautionary savings if they face idiosyncratic productivity risk z. Therefore, the wealth
distribution becomes more heterogenous in better accordance with reality. iii) The age-
dependent component ¹ ys helps to explain di®erences in the age-income distribution that is
important to explain the movement of the cross-section factor shares.
In each period t, an equal measure of 1-year old workers of productivity types e(1;²i;zj),
i = 1;2, j = 1;2, is born. During working age, s = 1;:::;44, the process for idiosyncratic
productivity zs is a Markov chain:
¼(z
0jz) = Probfzs+1 = z










Depending on his e±ciency type ², the agent receives pensions bt(²) = ²¹ bt in old age that
are ¯nanced by a social security tax ¿w;t on the young workers' wage income.
Let k, w, and r denote the individual capital stock, the wage rate and the interest rate,
respectively. The working agent of age s faces the following budget constraint in period t:
k
s+1
t+1 = (1 + rt)k
s




t; s = 1;:::;45: (3)
2The budget constraint of the retired worker is given by
k
s+1
t+1 = (1 + rt)k
s
t + bt(²) ¡ c
s
t; s = 46;:::;70: (4)
Agents are born without capital at age 1, k1
t ´ 0, and do not work in old age, ls
t = 1 for
s ¸ 46. In addition, we impose a borrowing constraint with ks
t ¸ 0.
2.2 Firms
Firms are competitive and produce output using capital K and labor N. Production Yt is
characterized by constant returns to scale and assumed to be Cobb-Douglas:





The aggregate technology level At 2 fA1;A2g follows a 2-state Markov process:
¼(A
0jA) = ProbfAt+1 = A










In a factor market equilibrium, factors are rewarded with their marginal product:









t ¡ ±: (8)
Capital K depreciates at rate ±.
2.3 Government
The government provides pensions to the retired agents. Pensions are proportional to the
current-period wage rate with the replacement ratio being denoted by ³. In addition, we





³²wt¹ n e±ciency-dependent. (9)
¹ n denotes the average labor supply in the economy in the non-stochastic steady state (with
A ´ 1). Therefore, pensions of the retired agents do not increase if the contemporary
workers increase their labor supply.
32.4 Stationary equilibrium
In the stationary equilibrium, individual behavior is consistent with the aggregate behavior
of the economy, households maximize intertemporal utility, ¯rms maximize pro¯ts, and
factor and goods' markets are in equilibrium. Let ft(k;s;²;z) denote the distribution of
individual wealth k, age s, the e±ciency type ², and idiosyncratic productivity z in the
period t.
A stationary equilibrium for a government policy f³g and initial measures f0(k;s;²;z)
in period 0 corresponds to a price system, an allocation, and a sequence of aggregate
productivity indicators fAtg that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Households maximize the intertemporal utility (1) subject to the budget constraint
(3) or (4), and the dynamics of the idiosyncratic productivity level z, (11). This gives



























Individual labor supply nt(k;s;²;z), consumption ct(k;s;²;z), and optimal next pe-
riod capital stock k0
t(k;s;²;z) in period t are functions of the individual state variables
fk;s;²;zg and also depend on the period t.
2. Firms maximize pro¯ts satisfying (7) and (8).

































where Ct and Bt denote aggregate consumption and pensions, respectively.
44. The government budget is balanced:
Bt = ¿w;twtNt:
In particular, the contribution rate ¿w;t adjusts in each period.
5. The goods' market clears:
Ct + Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt = Yt:
6. The cross-sectional measure ft evolves as
ft+1(K £ S £ E £ Z) =
Z X
s;²;z
Pt ((k;s;²;z);K £ S £ E £ Z) ft(k;s;²;z) dk
with





z02Z ¼(z0jz) if k0
t(k;s;²;z) 2 K;
² 2 E;s + 1 2 S;
0 else;
and for the newborns







4¢70 if 0 2 K
0 else:
2.5 Calibration and computation
We choose the parameter values ¯ = 0:99, ´ = 2:0, ° = 0:28, ® = 0:35, ± = 0:08 that are
standard in the business cycle literature.2 The Markov process (6) of aggregate technology








Aggregate technology is chosen so that the mean ¹ A is equal to one and the annual standard
deviation of output is approximately equal to 2% implying fA1;A2g = f0:98;1:02g.
2See, for example, Heer and Maussner (2005).
5The calibration of the individual productivity e(s;²;z) is chosen in accordance with Krueger
and Ludwig (2007). In particular, we pick f²1;²2g = f0:57;1:43g so that the average
productivity is one and the implied variance of labor income for the new entrants at age
s = 1 is equal to the value reported by Storesletten et al. (2004). The annual persistence of
the idiosyncratic component z is chosen to be 0.98. In addition, idiosyncratic productivity








The age-e±ciency ¹ ys pro¯le is taken from Hansen (1993). The calibration implies an
average labor supply approximately equal to ¹ n = 0:3 and a Gini coe±cient of income
(wealth) equal to 0.42 (0.58) in good accordance with empirical observations, even though
the values are lower than those of most recent studies on the empirical wealth and income
distribution. In particular, for the US economy, Rodriguez et al. (2002) ¯nd a value of 0.55
(0.80) for the income Gini (wealth Gini).3
The replacement ratio of average pensions relative to net wage earnings is equal to ³ =
¹ bt
(1¡¿w;t)wt¹ n = 30%, with ¹ n = 0:3.
The computation is based upon the algorithm of Krusell and Smith (1998) and follows
Storesletten et al. (2004). A detailed description is provided in the Appendix.
3 Results
Figure 1 describes the behavior of our economy in the non-stochastic steady state. In
the upper row, we graph the average wealth and labor supply of each generaton, while
the average total income of each generation and the e±ciency-age pro¯les e(s;²;z) for
the four productivity types f²i;zjg for i = 1;2, j = 1;2, are displayed in the lower row.
Agents accumulate savings until retirement age s = 45 (corresponding to real lifetime
age 65 in the Figure 1) and dissave thereafter. Total income (wage plus interest income
before taxes) peaks at real lifetime age 50. Our average-age pro¯les accord very well with
empirical observations in Rodriguez et al. (2002). Based on the 1998 data from the Survey
of Consumer Finances they ¯nd that US household income, earnings, and wealth peak
around ages 51-55, 51-55, and 61-65, respectively.
In order to compute the correlation of the income distribution with output, we simulate
the dynamics of our economy repeatedly over 200 periods. One of these simulations is
3In order to get an even better match of the model and empirical Gini coe±cients, we should introduce
entrepreneuership into the model as, for example, in Quadrini (2000). However, we kept the model as
simple as possible in order to illustrate the main e®ects.
6Figure 1: Non-stochastic steady state age-pro¯les
illustrated in Figure 2. In the lower picture, we graph the dynamics of output.4 If the
technology level jumps from A1 to A2 or vice versa, this is also instantaneously re°ected
in the movement of the production level. In the upper picture, we graph the behavior of
the Gini coe±cient of total income. Obviously, total income is highly procyclical. The
correlation coe±cient of the total income Gini coe±cient with output amounts to 0.87.
As a simple explanation, the high-productivity workers increase their labor supply by a
higher percentage than the low-productivity workers when the wage rates increases during
an economic expansion.
Table 1 takes a detailed look at the behavior of the income quintiles. In the ¯rst entry
row, we display the empirical correlations of output with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th income
quintiles, and the 80-95% and 95-100% income groups for the US economy, respectively.5 In
the second row, you ¯nd the values as resulting from the simulation of the most preferred
model of Casta~ neda et al. (1998). The last two lines display the values obtained from
simulating our economy for the two cases that pensions are either proportional to the
4Logarithmic output has been detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter with smoothing parameter
¸ = 100.
5The estimates are reproduced from Table 4 in Casta~ neda et al. (1998).
7Figure 2: Time series simulation
individual e±ciency ² or lump-sum. Obviously, the model with lump-sum pensions is our
preferred model (last row). In this case, the income share of the ¯rst and fourth income
quintile and the top 5% group match the empirical correlations almost perfectly, while the
correlations of the 2nd and 3rd income quintiles with output are too low.
In our model, the dynamics of the income distribution are mainly driven by the intertem-
poral substitution of labor. During an economic expansion, wages increase and labor
(replacement) income is redistributed 1) from low-productivity to high productivity work-
ers, 2) old wealth-rich to young wealth-poor workers, and 3) retired agents to working
agents as the former groups increase their labor supply to a larger extent than the latter,
respectively. In our economy with overlapping generations, the highest income quintile
consists of the workers aged 50-60 with high productivity as these agents have the highest
wage income and relatively high interest income. As these agents also hold relatively high
wealth, they do not increase their labor supply as much as the younger high-productivity
workers. As a consequence, the total income share of the top 5% income earners is almost
acyclical.
The lowest income quintile in our economy consists of the very old retired workers (aged
8Table 1: Correlation of output with income shares
0-20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-95% 95-100%
US 0.53 0.49 0.31 -0.29 -0.64 0.00
Casta~ neda et al. (1998) 0.95 0.92 0.73 -0.56 -0.90 -0.84
our model
i) bt(²) = ²¹ bt -0.15 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.31 0.03
ii) bt(²) = ¹ bt 0.40 -0.47 -0.11 -0.24 0.60 0.04
Notes: Entries in rows 1 and 2 are reproduced from Table 4 in Casta~ neda et al. (1998). Annual logarithmic output
has been detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter with smoothing parameter ¸ = 100.
80 and above) and the young workers with low productivity ²1 and z1 (aged 20-30). Since
the pension income falls relative to the wage income during an economic expansion, the
correlation of output with the income share of the ¯rst quintile is not close to unity as in
Casta~ neda et al. (1998). Therefore, the introduction of overlapping generations, pensions,
and elastic labor helps to improve upon the modeling of the income distribution business
cycles dynamics. In fact, in our model, the correlations of the ¯rst and second income
quintiles with output are even a little bit too low compared to empirical observations.
The latter de¯ciency of our model, of course, could be improved by the introduction of
unemployment risk so that the number of employed workers in the lowest income quintiles
becomes more procyclical again.
4 Conclusion
Previous work by Casta~ neda et al. (1998) has been very successful to model the business
cycle dynamics of the di®erent income quintiles except for the top 5% group. In addition,
the lower income quintiles very almost perfectly correlated with output which is at odds
with empirical observations for the US economy. We presented a model with overlapping
generations, pensions, and elastic labor that helps to overcome these de¯ciencies. We
therefore conclude that a business cycle model of the income distribution should be a
hybrid model including both the risk of unemployment and overlapping generations with
elastic labor supply.
9References
Casta~ neda, A., J. D¶ ³az-Gimin¶ enez, J.-V. R¶ ³os-Rull, 1998, Exploring the income distribu-
tion business cycle dynamics, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 42, 93-130.
Hansen, G., 1993, The cyclical and secular behavior of the labor input: comparing e±-
ciency units and hours worked, Journal of Applied Econometrics 8, 71-80.
Heer, B., and A. Maussner, 2005, Dynamic General Equilibrium models: Computational
Methods and Applications, Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Heer, B., and A. Maussner, 2007, The Burden of Unanticpated In°ation: Analysis of
an Overlapping Generations Model with Progressive Income Taxation and Staggered
Prices, mimeo.
Krueger, D., and A. Ludwig, 2007, On the Consequences of Demographic Change for
Rates of Returns to Capital, and the Distribution of Wealth and Welfare, Journal of
Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
Krusell, P., and A. Smith, 1998, Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy,
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 106, 867-96.
Quadrini, V., 2000, Entrepreneurship, Saving and Social Mobility, Review of Economic
Dynamics, vol. 3, 1-40.
Rodriguez, S.B., J. D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, V. Quadrini, and J.V. R¶ ³os-Rull, 2002, Updated Facts
on the U.S. Distributions of Earnings, Income, and Wealth, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis Quarterly Review, vol. 26, 2-35.
Storesletten, K., C.I. Telmer, and A. Yaron, 2004, Asset pricing with idiosyncratic risk
and overlapping generations, mimeo.
105 Appendix: Computation of the model
In order to compute the model of Section 2, we use the algorithm of Krusell and Smith
(1998). This algorithm has been applied to overlapping generations models by Storesletten
et al. (2004), among others. Our computation follows common practice in this literature
and is described by the following steps:
Algorithm: Computation of the OLG model with individual and aggregate uncertainty
Step 1: Compute the non-stochastic steady state with A ´ 1. Store the policy functions
and the steady-state distribution of fk;s;²;zg.
Step 2: Choose an initial parameterized functional form for the law of motion for the
aggregate next-period capital stock K0 = g(K;A) and employment N0 = h(K0;A0).
Step 3: Solve the consumer's optimization problem as a function of the individual and
aggregate state variables, fk;s;²;z;K;Ag.
Step 4: Simulate the dynamics of the distribution function.
Step 5: Use the time path for the distribution to estimate the law of motion for K0 and
N0.
Step 6: Iterate until the parameters converge.
Step 7: Test the goodness of ¯t for the functional form using, for example, R2. If the ¯t is
satisfactory, stop, otherwise choose a di®erent functional form for g(:) and/or h(:).
In the ¯rst step, the non-stochastic steady state allocation is computed with standard
methods. In particular, we discretize the individual state space using a grid over the
individual asset space k of 50 points and interpolate linearly between points. The policy
functions k0(k;s;²;z) and n(k;s;²;z) are computed from the ¯rst-order conditions of the
household starting in the last period of life, s = 90. Special care has to be taken of the
corner solutions with n = 0 and k0 = 0.6 The optimal policy functions are stored in order
to use them as an initial guess for the policy functions in step 3. Similarly, we save the
non-stochastic steady state distribution and use it as initial distribution for the simulation
of the stochastic economy in step 4.
6In addition, we use our own routine for the solution of non-linear equations that is able to handle
returns in the form of missing values if, for example, consumption is negative and utility is not de¯ned.
For details, please see Chapters 7 and 8 in Heer and Maussner (2005).
11In the second step, we postulate the following laws of motion for the next-period capital
stock and employment:
K
0 = exp(µ0 + µ1 ln(K) + µ21A0=A1 + µ31A0=A1 ln(K));
N
0 = exp(·0 + ·1 ln(K
0) + ·21A0=A1 + ·31A0=A1 ln(K
0)):
Notice in particular that next-period employment is a function of next-period capital stock
K0 and next-period aggregate productivity A0 only. Therefore, employment N is not an
aggregate state variable. As an initialization, we set µ2 = µ3 = ·1 = ·2 = ·3 = 0. We
choose µ1 = 0:9 and compute µ0 and ·0 so that K0 = K and N0 = N correspond to their
non-stochastic steady state values, respectively.
As our solution, we ¯nd the following laws of motion:
K
0 = exp(0:0610 + 0:0126ln(K) + 0:9076 1A0=A1 ¡ 0:0043 1A0=A1 ln(K));
N
0 = exp(¡1:265 + 0:0179ln(K
0) ¡ 0:1751 1A0=A1 + 0:0064 1A0=A1 ln(K
0)):
In step 3, we compute the individual policy function as functions of the individual and
aggregate state variables for given law of motion for K0 and N0. For this reason, we
choose a rather loose grid for the aggregate capital stock K as the curvature of the policy
function with respect to this argument is rather low. We ¯nd that 7 points are su±cient.
Furthermore, we choose 80% and 120% of the non-stochastic steady state aggregate capital
stock as the lower and upper boundary for this interval. In our simulations, the aggregate
capital stock always remains within these boundaries.
Starting with the non-stochastic steady state distribution as our initial distribution f0(k;s;²;z),
we simulate the dynamics of the economy. We use a pseudo-random number generator in
order to simulate the economy over 200 periods repeatedly. Given the distribution in pe-
riod t, ft(k;s;²;z), we can compute the next-period distribution, ft+1(k;s;²;z), with the
help of the policy functions k0(k;s;²;z;K;A) and n(k;s;²;z;K;A). In addition, we can
compute aggregate production and the income shares of the di®erent quintiles. For a more
detailed description of this step, please see Heer and Maussner (2005), Chapter 6.
We update the parameters by estimating the law of motions for the simulated time series
with the help of OLS. We stop the algorithm as soon as the maximum change of the µi
and ·j is below 0.001. In our last iteration, the R2 in the two regressions of the law of
motion exceeds 0.999, respectively. Therefore, we can be con¯dent that our postulated
laws of motion g(:) and h(:) are satisfactory. The computation takes some 20 hours on a
Intel Pentium(R) M, 319 MHz machine. The computer programs are available from the
author upon request.
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